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JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter as it is
before the Court on a Petition for Certiorari from the Court of
Appeals, according to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Title VII.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is a Brief in Opposition to Appellant's Petition for
Certiorari from an order of affirmance entered by the Court of
Appeals on November 23, 1990.

On December

19, 1990 an order

denying rehearing was entered by the Court of Appeals.
The underlying decision which was affirmed was made by Judge
David Young of the Third District Court in December, 1989 in which
the property of the parties was divided equitably, according to the
terms

of

a

constructive

trust which

was

created

between

the

parties.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. Should Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari be granted,
when his petition fails to meet the requirements of Rule 4 6 and 49
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure?
2.

Are there grounds for a Petition for Certiorari to be

granted in this matter?
3. Is the Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari frivolous, and
should the Respondent be granted her reasonable attorney's fees and
costs incurred in responding to Petitioner's request?
ISSUES AS PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONER
4. The issues as presented by the Petitioner are so varied and
1

incoherent as to make a rational response to them

difficult, if

not impossible and the Respondent has chosen not to respond to them
individually, other than to state that the issues are incoherent
and irrelevant to this matter at this time.
4. The Argument presented by the Petitioner, as gleaned by the
Respondent, is that a new trial should have been held after the
first decision of the Court of Appeals, and that the parties should
be deemed to be partners; and that the denial of a new trial and
a

finding

that

the

parties

were

in

partnership,

with

the

application of partnership law to the dissolution of the parties
relationship, was such serious error that the Supreme Court should
grant Certiorari in this matter.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Title VII Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case.

This is an appeal from an order entered

by Judge David Young of the Third District Court in December, 1989,
which terminated the relationship of the parties and equitably
divided

their

joint

assets

pursuant

to

the

legal

theory

of

constructive trust.
Course of the proceedings.

This appeal is from a final order

of Judge David Young of the Third District Court.
filed a complaint for divorce on October 14, 1983.
this matter was held on June 9, 1987.

The Plaintiff
The trial in

The Plaintiff and Defendant

presented witnesses and testimony of both of them was taken, and
closing arguments were heard. The Trial Court determined that the
2

parties relationship was a common-law marriage, and he equitably
divided the parties1 assets.
The defendant appealed, and received a decision

dated July

5, 1989, which indicated that the parties1 relationship was not a
common-law marriage.

The decision did suggest several other legal

theories which might apply.
The

plaintiff

then

filed

proposed

findings

of

fact,

conclusions of law, and order dividing the parties1 assets pursuant
to

a constructive

trust, which was

approved

by

the court

in

December, 1989.
The defendant then filed the appeal to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the order of the District Court on November 23,
1990.

Appellant's request for rehearing was denied on December

18, 1990.
Disposition in the trial court.

After the Court of Appeals

decision on July 5, 1989, the Trial Court found that the parties
relationship was a constructive trust, based upon the confidential
nature of the parties' relationship, and the substantial unjust
enrichment which would occur if the defendant were allowed to
retain all of the parties' assets.
Statement of material facts.

Plaintiff,

Helen

Layton,

hereinafter known as "Helen" and the Defendant, Donald Layton,
hereinafter known as "Don" met in 1946 when Helen was fifteen
(T57,L17) years old. After about two years, Helen began to work
with

Don

(T58,L7).

cutting

down

trees, before

and

after her

other

job

In 1952, at age 20 she became pregnant, and went to
3

California (T59,L2) for a time, but returned to Utah and lived with
Don's parents until the baby (the parties1 son Robert), was born
on November 6, 1952 (T59,L11).
until 1954.
living.

Helen then lived with her parents

During this time, Helen and Don felled trees for a

With the money they earned, she and Don bought a fire

damaged house located at Banks Court in Salt Lake City (T59,L14),
and worked together to make it habitable, and in 1954 Helen and
young Robert moved in (T60,L19). Don moved in a short time later.
Don

and

Helen

intended

to get married,

and

even

purchased

a

marriage license, but they "never got around" to getting married
(T61,L22).

The parties began living together in 1954 and lived

together almost continuously

until

1983, when this action was

filed. (F.F.#1)
The parties continued to work together, felling trees and
demolishing houses for income. They began purchasing real property
at tax sales, and bought a number of parcels, and one five acre
parcel which was located at 3 3 00 South and Wasatch Boulevard was
purchased for the sum of $6,666.66
year installments (T62,L25).

which was paid in $1,000 per

In approximately 1961 that property

was sold for the sum of $40,000.00 and the parties used those funds
to purchase further properties.
Helen always participated in the choice of property and the
negotiations for price and terms of each purchase. Over the years,
some parcels have been sold or condemned by various government
agencies, and the proceeds from those sales have always been used
to pay expenses for the family, the properties, or to purchase
4

further parcels.
From 1954 until 1980 the parties supported themselves from
the earnings of the properties, the sale of raspberries and other
fruit tended and picked by them, from tree felling, and demolition
work.

Neither party had regular full time employment for a third

person. (F.F.#3)

Helen worked alongside Don on a full time basis,

even when pregnant with their three subsequent children (T63,L10).
The only time she did not work an equal amount with Don was when
Angie (born in 1962) and Michael (born in 1964) were very small,
but as soon as they were in school she resumed roofing, painting,
and otherwise managing the parties1 properties.

She also did all

of the bookkeeping for the family, which was a considerable amount
of work, during those years (F.F.#3,4)
Helen and Don held themselves out to all who knew them as a
married couple (T27,L18) (T20,L3) (T12,L25) (T37,L25), and the real
property purchased by them reflects both of their names.

The

parcels which do not reflect joint ownership which Helen claims
should be awarded to her are titled in Don's name alone due to an
oversight.

The parties had no funds which were not joint, and all

property purchased during that time should be

(and most were)

placed in joint names.
The parties had a joint bank account (T64,L2), in the name
of Don or Helen Layton and they filed joint income tax returns each
year (T63,L24) (F.F.#2).

All income from their various pursuits

was used to support themselves, their children, and the properties,
and there is no indication that there was any division of any of
5

the real or personal property of the parties along the lines of
"yours" or "mine" during the history of the parties prior to their
difficulties and final separation.
In early 1971 Danny was born afflicted with Down's Syndrome,
and the parties troubles began.

Helen was asked to leave the

parties1 residence in 1976 (T67,L1), and was gone for three months,
but moved back to the family residence at Banks Court in October
of that year.

In early 1977 Helen again moved out (T67,L6), this

time for four months, and then again moved back to Banks Court (the
family residence).

During this separation Helen had no outside

job, and continued to do what she could to further the family
business.
During the 1970f s the Plaintiff did make the writing which
states "I hereby relinquish all claims to all property in the name
of

Don

Layon

and

Helen

Layton."

There

is

no

evidence

of

consideration for the writing, and the property mentioned therein
is not

identified

with

enough particularity

for the Court to

determine what property, if any, was being transferred. (F.F. #14,
15,16. )
The parties did not later ratify the writing by tranferring
all of the jointly held real or personal property into the name of
the Defendant, or otherwise behave as though they thought the
writing had any validity. (F.F.17)
In November of 1979 Helen went to California (T70,L5) and did
obtain employment there.

She returned in April of 1980 to file a

joint income tax return with Don, as the parties had done since
6

approximately 1954.

In May of that year, Don purchased the house

at Villa Drive, "for Helen." (T50,L8)

She returned to Utah in May

and moved into the house. Helen obtained employment with Gem State
Mutual Insurance Company in the Fall of 1980, and her earnings went
to pay the household expenses on the Villa Drive house (T71,L25),
along with whatever else was needed.

During this time she still

worked to care for the properties on weekends and evenings (took
her vacation to pick raspberries) and the parties still lived
together and held themselves out to be husband and wife.

Don

lived at Banks Court for a few months after May of 1980, but
eventually he moved to the Villa Drive house and the parties lived
together until 1983 (T72,L7).

Helen left the Villa Drive house in

1983 and filed this action.
The property of the parties was essentially intact at the time
of the filing of this action. (F.F.19).
Don has had the full management and control of all of the
parties1 properties, both real and personal, since the filing of
this action.

He has had the personal use and enjoyment of all of

the income from the property, and he has had the burden of caring
for the property, but he has not paid all of the property taxes
and assessments which are outstanding against the real property of
the parties.

The income from the properties is approximately

$32,000 per year, and the property taxes are approximately $12,000
per year, leaving a difference of $22,000 per year for living
expenses and any other expenses required for the property.(F.F.#12)

7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT PRESENTED TO COURT OF APPEALS
1.

The findings and decree of the Trial Court are supported

by the evidence and are not an abuse of discretion.

The Plaintiff

presented evidence that she and the Defendant had a continuous, if
sometimes stormy, relationship from 1954 until 1983. Witnesses and
documents

presented

into

evidence

proved

that

the

parties1

relationship was of the type contemplated by the cases regarding
constructive trust, as the defendant was holding assets which in
equity and good conscience should be possessed by the plaintiff,
due to their long relationship and the absence of separate funds
between them.(F.F.#8,9,10)
A great injustice would occur if the defendant were allowed
to retain all of the parties1 assets, almost all of which are held
in

joint

name, which

represented

the

fruit

of

both

parties'

lifetime of work and effort.
The Defendant at trial, or since the decision of the Court of
Appeals, has

refused to provide any evidence or argument as to the

fairness or lack thereof of the proposed property settlement, other
than to allege that the Plaintiff should receive nothing.

The

Plaintiff produced an extensive exhibit of the properties, showing
their locations, tax valuations, purchase prices, and including
photographs, if relevant. The Plaintiff stated under oath that she
would agree that the Defendant could receive either side of the
list dividing the property prepared by her. The Defendant has never
presented any evidence that the division according to that list was
8

unfair. Accordingly, the division was equitable, and the Court did
not abuse its discretion in finding that the relationship between
the parties consisted of a constructive trust, which should now be
dissolved.
There is no need for further evidentiary hearing or amendment
of pleadings, as the evidence at trial was complete, and adequately
addressed the issues presented by the theory of constructive trust
as well as the legal theories actually presented at trial.

In any

event, the defendant did not object to the Court's determination
that

a

constructive

trust

existed

between

the

parties,

and

accordingly should not be allowed to do so now.
2.

The law relating to constructive trusts was correctly

applied in this matter such that the judgment of the Trial Court
should

stand.

confidential

The

theory

of

constructive

trust

requires

a

relationship between the parties, and an inequity

which would result if one of the parties were allowed to retain
assets

as

a

result

of

the

detriment of the other party.

confidential

relationship,

to

the

Such a relationship existed here,

and accordingly, the law was correctly applied.(F.F.#8,9,10)
ARGUMENT REGARDING PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
1. The Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari fails to meet the
requirements of Rules 46 and 49 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure,

in

that

it

fails

to

address

the

requirements

for

Certiroari to be granted, which in question and answer form are:
(a) Has a panel of the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
in conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of
9

Appeals on the same issue of law?
No.

The Petitioner does not cite any conflict within the

Court of Appeals which would justify a Writ of Certiorari being
granted.
(b) Has a panel of the Court of Appeals decided question of
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision
of the Supreme Court?
No.

The Petitioner does not cite any conflict between the

Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court which would justify a Writ
of Certiorari being granted.
(c) Has the Court of Appeals rendered a decisions that has so
far

departed

from

the

accepted

and

usual

course

of

judicial

proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower
court as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court ! s power of
supervision?
No. Both decisions by the Court of Appeals have not sanctioned
any departure of the lower court from the accepted and usual course
of

judicial

proceedings.

The

decisions

in

this

matter

are

equitable under the very unusual circumstances of this case, and
this matter does not need any reconsideration by the Supreme Court.
(d) Has the Court of Appeals decided an important question of
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should
be, settled by the Supreme Court:
No.

This matter does not rely upon municipal, state, or

federal statutory law, but instead relies upon case law in the
State of Utah.
10

2.

This Petition for Certiorari

is frivolous, given the

incoherent nature of the Petitioner's brief and arguments before
the Court of Appeals, and the bizarre nature of his Petition for
Certiorari, and his continued irse of the judicial process to harass
the Respondent at great personal cost to her.
3.

The

Respondent

should

be

awarded

her

reasonable

attorneyfs fees and costs incurred in this matter, due to the
incoherent and repetitive nature of the Petitioner's arguments, and
the frivolousness of his Petition.

The appellant failed to file

a supersedeas bond in this matter, yet the mere existence of this
continued appeal has prevented the Respondent from selling any of
the property

awarded

to her to raise badly

needed

cash.

To

compound that injury, she has been forced to expend her meager
funds to pay attorney's fees to respond to yet another appellate
Petition in this matter.
RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT
Don, by his Petition, has asked the Supreme Court to grant
Certiorari in this matter, in order to obtain a new trial and have
the parties' relationship

declared

to be a partnership.

The

Petitioner has failed, in prior briefs and in this one, to show how
there would be a different result if the parties relationship was
a partnership, or what new

evidence could be presented at a new

trial which would cause the trial court, or subsequent appellate
court, to render a different decision.

As a result of his failure

to show how the result could possibly be different, Petitioner has
failed to meet his burden of proving that the decision of the Court
11

of Appeals so departs from accepted law that it should be reviewed
by the Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
The parties had a 19 year relationship, during which time they
raised four children and pooled all of their assets.

Don has

attempted to appropriate those assets for himself, and the Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals have refused to allow him to do so.
Instead, the Trial Court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, has
imposed a constructive trust upon the parties and their assets, and
has equitably divided them between the parties.
This matter is one that contains unusual facts, and which has
had a long and strange history largely due to the Petitioner's
representation of himself in this matter.

The decisions in this

matter are correct under the law and facts of this matter, and
there is no need for review by the Supreme Court.

That review

alone, regardless of result, would cause considerable hardship for
the Respondent, who has already suffered through two appeals in
this matter.
RELIEF REQUESTED
Respondent
Certiorari

requests

be denied,

that

the

Petitioner's

and that she be awarded

Petition
her

for

reasonable

attorney's fees and costs incurred in replying to the Petitioner's
request.
DATED this

day of March, 1991.
Jane Allen
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent
Helen Layton
12

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed

a copy of the foregoing

Respondent's Brief in Response to Petition for Certiorari to the
Appellant, Don Layton, 220 Banks Court Salt Lake City, Utah
this

day of March, 1991.
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Helen Layton,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
Donald Layton,

Case No. 870378-CA

Defendant and Appellant.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable David S. Young
Attorneys:

Donald Layton, Salt Lake City, Pro Se Appellant
Jane Allen, Salt Lake City, for Respondent

Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Bullock.*
BULLOCK, Judge:
The defendant appeals from an order of the district court
dividing property owned by unmarried cohabitants at the end of
their relationship.
Donald and Helen Layton lived together and held themselves
out to be husband and wife for many years, although they were
never legally married. Four children were born to "the Laytons,"
the youngest of whom is a mentally handicapped child of about 18
years.

1.
J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting by special
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(1)(j) (1937).

During their life together, the parties both worked fulltime
in the same business endeavors, such as felling trees; acquiring,
renovating, renting, and selling real property; picking and
selling raspberries; and a variety of other pursuits* Title to
most of their relatively extensive property holdings is in
cotenancy;2 however, title to some parcels is in Donaldfs name
alone, and one parcel acquired in part with joint funds appears
to be in Helenfs name alone. Helen sued for divorce in 1983 and
later amended her complaint to add a claim for partition. The
district court concluded that the parties' relationship was a
marriage as defined in Utah Code Ann, § 30-1-4.5 (1989), and that
their assets could therefore "be divided according to the
equitable principles governing divorce actions.- A decree was
accordingly entered dividing the property. Neither alimony nor
divorce is mentioned in the decree. Custody of the handicapped
child was awarded to Helen, who was also awarded child support of
$200 per month.
Donald challenges the division of property on appeal. He
argues, in effect, that there is no legal basis for awarding any
property to Helen, that their relationship cannot be treated as a
marriage, and that Helen relinquished her rights to the cotenancy
property awarded her as evidenced by an unsigned, undated note,
which appears to be in Helen's handwriting. The note reads: HI
hereby relinquish all claim to all property in the name of Don
Layton [and] Helen Layton.H Donald also argues against the
custody award.
In reviewing the property division, we turn first to a
consideration of the trial court's conclusion that the Laytons'
relationship could be treated as a marriage according to Utah
Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5, which recognizes as a marriage a
relationship between cohabitants if the relationship satisfies
certain specified criteria. Before adoption of section 30-1-4.5
in 1987, Utah did not recognize an unsolemnized relationship as a
marriage, even though the parties to the relationship may have
acted in other respects as spouses.3

2. We use the term "cotenancy" in this case to refer to either
joint tenancy or tenancy in common, since the distinctions
between the two are not material in this case.
3.

Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1177, 1181 (Utah App. 1988).

2

The complaint in this case was filed in 1983, about four
years before section 30-1-4.5 was enacted. Since that section
affects the substantive rights of the parties, and absent a
contrary provision by the legislature in enacting it, it has only
prospective, and not retroactive, effect.4
Thus, the trial
court mischaracterized the Laytons1 relationship as a marriage.
Helen suggests alternative grounds, besides marriage, for
sustaining the trial court's award of property to her. As
illustrated by cases in this jurisdiction as well as in others,
an equitable division of property accumulated by unmarried
cohabitants has been sustained upon finding a partnership,5
contract for services,6 and/or a trust.7 However, none of
these theories was pleaded in this case or appears to have been
sufficiently pursued in the proceedings before the trial court.
Helen requested partition in her amended complaint, but only in a
generalized fashion and without the supporting information on the
status of title required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-39-2 (1987).8
There are no findings or conclusions concerning any grounds for
the property award other than a marriage-equivalent under Utah
Code Ann. § 30-1-4.5, which we have held to be inapplicable in
view of its effective date. There are likewise no findings or
conclusions concerning custody and child support,9 or concerning
4. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 253 (Utah 1988); Stephens
v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 952, 953-54 (Utah 1987); Carlucci v. Utah
Industrial Comm'n, 725 P.2d 1335, 1336-37 (Utah 1986).
5. Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3 (1989); Cutler v. Bowen, 543 P.2d
1349, 1351 (Utah 1975). Partnership doctrines have sometimes
been applied to relationships between unmarried cohabitants.
E.g., Cook v. Cook, 691 P.2d 664 (Ariz. 1984).
6. Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977); Marvin v. Marvin,
18 Cal.3d 660, 557 P.2d 106 (1976).
7. See Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147 (Utah 1987); In re Hock,
655 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1982); cf.. Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d at
1181-82.
8. Utah Code Ann. Title 78, Chapter 39 requires investigation
of property title and certain procedural safeguards before
partition may be granted. It does not appear from the record
that these requirements have yet been satisfied.
9.
See Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909 (Utah App. 1988)
(remanded for lack of findings on support of adult handicapped
child).

the effect on Helen*s property rights of the unsigned, undated
notation. Since we do not consider the evidence in the first
instance,10 we reverse and remand for such further findings
and orders based thereon as the trial court deems
appropriate.
^

J^f jXjJLnS/
obert Bullock, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

iussell W. Bench, Judge

10. Zion's First Nat'l Bank, N.A. v. National Am. Title Ins.
Co., 749 P.2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988).
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Jane Allen, Bar #45
Attorney for Plaintiff
8 East 300 South, Suite 735
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 355-1300
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
HELEN LAYTON,
Plaintiff,

)
])

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.

]

DONALD LAYTON,

])

Civil No. D83-3977

]i

Judge David Young

Defendant.

This matter was decided by the Utah Court of Appeals on July
9, 1989.

The Court remanded this matter to the trial court for

further findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with
the evidence presented at trial. The Appeals Court ruled that the
parties1 relationship was not covered by the statute regarding
common law marriage, but a number of other legal theories were
suggested.

The Plaintiff proposed her findings, and the Defendant

responded.

After considering the arguments of both parties, the

court ordered that the theory of constructive trust be applied to
this matter, and based upon the record herein and good cause
appearing therefor, the Court makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The parties herein began living together in 1954, and lived
together almost continuously until 1983, when this action was
filed.

2. The parties filed joint income taxes from 1954 until 1983.
3.

The parties pooled all of their income, which was

exclusively

from joint business endeavors, which were buying and

selling real property, felling trees, demolition of buildings, sale
of raspberries each summer.
4.

The parties owned no real property at the time their

relationship began, and all real and personal property owned by
them at the time of trial was purchased during the time they lived
together and was purchased with joint funds. The relationship of
the parties could be described as similar to a marriage, with the
relationship being confidential, and with each party dependent upon
the other for various services and emotional support during the
time the relationship existed.
5.

The equitable distribution as rendered by the Court is

supported by the principles of the parties1 conduct, which created
a constructive trust.
6.

A constructive trust is arises to prevent manifest

injustice and can be applied to almost any circumstances, as set
forth in CJS, Sec.142 as follows:
Generally, any transaction may be the basis for creating a
constructive trust where for any reason the defendant holds funds
which in equity and good consience should be possessed by the
plaintiff, and the forms and varieties of constructive trusts are
practically without limit.
7.

In this matter, the parties lived as though they were

married, and had considerable joint assets.

A great injustice

would occur if the defendant were allowed to retain all of the

parties1 assets, which represented the fruit of both parties'
lifetime of work and effort.
8.

Accordingly, a constructive trust may be imposed in this

matter, not necessarily because of the intention of the parties,
but because the person holding title to the property would be
unuustly enriched if he were permitted to keep the property. (See
Doing vs. Riley, CA Fla., 176 F. 2d 449; Potter vs. Lindsay,

60

N. W. 2d 133, 337 Mich. 404; Miller vs. Buecker, Comm. PI., 63 York
Leg. Rec. 53; Copenhaver vs. Duncan, Comm. PI., 60 York Leg. Rec.
105; McConnel vs. Dixon, 233 P. 2d 877, 68 Wyo. 301.)
9.

Utah has recognized the concept of constructive trusts,

and has no statues barring the application of this theory in this
matter.
10.

Their relationship and the divisions of the assets

accumulated

therein

are

governed

by

said

trust

whether

in

individual names or joint names.
11.

The Court further finds that matters related to property

distribution are unchanged hereby.

The Court followed equitable

principles in dividing the property and orders that those findings
and that distribution be set forth herein.
12.

From 1983 until June of 1987 the Defendant had complete

control of the parties1 assets and he received all income thereon,
and accordingly he should be responsible for all indebtedness,
property taxes, and assessments which were levied on the property
during that time that have not been paid by him.
13.

The parties raised

four children, one of whom is

handicapped and is in need of support beyond age 18. Danny, said

child, is presently residing with the Plaintiff, and she is in need
of support for his care and support in the sum of $200.00 per month
until such time as he no longer resides with her.
14.

The Plaintiff did make the writing which states that "I

hereby relinquish all claims to all property in the name of Don
Layton and Helen Layton."
15. The writing was made sometime in the 1970's, and an exact
date is impossible to determine, as the writing is not dated and
the parties1 testimony differs as to the approximate date.
16.

There is no evidence of consideration for the writing,

and the property mentioned therein is not identified with enough
particularity for the court to determine what property, if any, was
being transferred.
17.

The parties did not

later ratify

the writing by

transferring all of the jointly held real or personal property into
the name of the Defendant in reliance thereon, or otherwise
behaving as though the writing had validity.

Instead, they

continued their relationship as they had in the past.
18. The Court finds the note signed by the Plaintiff stating,
"I hereby relinquish all claim to all property in the name of Don
Layton and Helen Layton11

to be unsupported by consideration and

further to have been ignored by the parties until the Defendant
attempted to use it to his aadvantage in these proceedings. Thus,
this Court finds the note to be a nullity and ignores its content.
19. At the time of the filing of this action the parties1
property, both real and personal, was essentially intact, and had,
except

for

small

sales, not been

transferred

to

others

or

encumbered by either of them.
Having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now
makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The

parties

confidential

relationship

is

best

characterized as a constructive trust.
2. All property acquired by the parties, whether in joint or
separate name, has been equitably divided in an approximately equal
division according to value, as set forth below.
3. The parties to this action were the only beneficiaries of
the constructive trust, and have been duly notified of this action,
and sufficient evidence was obtained at trial to indicate a need
to equitably divide the assets of the trust.
4.

The writing produced by the Defendant does not transfer

any trust property to him, and is invalid, as it is not supported
by consideration nor has it been later ratified by the parties.
5. Accordingly, the personal and real property of the parties
shall be equitably

divided between them as follows:

PERSONAL PROPERTY:
6. The parties, along with their personal effects, owned, at
the time of the parties1 separation the following items all of
which are presently in the possession of the Defendant:
four motorcycles
three pianos
Yamaha Organ
600 ounces of silver
Train collection (est. value $10,000.00)
Mechanics tools
Carpenters tools
Tree cutting tools
Caterpillar tractor
Road grader

Dump truck
Three pickup trucks
Camper
1959 Corvette
Saab Automobile
Gun collection
Substantial miscellaneous personal property
7. The Plaintiff shall retain the personal property in her
possession, and the Defendant shall awarded the personal property
in his possession, with the party

retaining an

responsible for all indebtedness thereon.

item to be

However, there is a

substantial inequity in this division, and the Plaintiff shall be
awarded the parcels of real property numbered 23-873-1 and 23-874,
page number 64 and 59 of Exhibit A as her sole and separate
property, subject to no claim by the Defendant.
8. The Plaintiff shall be awarded all personal property and
fixtures which is inside or on the real property awarded to her.
REAL PROPERTY:
9. The real property of the parties is extensive, and it is
divided as set forth in exhibit A, which is attached hereto.
PAST DUE PROPERTY TAXES, SEWER ASSESSMENTS, AND WATER BILLS:
10. The Defendant shall be responsible for all property taxes,
sewer assessments, and water bills and any other unpaid expenses
for the property awarded to the Plaintiff until it was transferred
to the Plaintiff's name alone, which occurred in July of 1987, and
those debts should be paid by Helen being awarded a lien against
parcel no.17-4963, page 50 of Exhibit A.

The amount of said lien

remains to be determined, and if the parties cannot agree as to the
amount, either party may move the court for a determination of the

amount of said lien. Said lien shall be paid whenever the property
is sold, or the Plaintiff may foreclose upon her lien if she so
desires.
CHILD SUPPORT:
11. The Defendant shall pay child support to the Plaintiff
inlthe sum of $200.00 per month for so long as he resides with the
Plaintiff.
12. Both parties shall maintain health and accident insurance
for

Daniel

so

long as

it is available through his or her

employment, and they shall share equally any medical, dental,
orthodontic or optical expenses incurred by him which are not
covered by insurance.
13. The Plaintiff shall be awarded the custody of Daniel,
subject to

the Defendant's reasonable rights of visitation.

SIGN ALL PAPERS:
14. The Defendant shall sign a quit-claim deed for each parcel
awarded to the Plaintiff, and she shall do the same, within two
weeks of the decision of this Court. If the Defendant should fail
to do so, the Plaintiff may petition the Court and have the Court
execute the documents, and the Defendant shall be responsible for
her attorney's fees required in doing so.
ATTORNEY'S FEES:
15. Each party should be responsible for his or her own
attorney's fees and costs. Should the Defendant again appeal this
matter, he should be responsible for the Plaintiff's reasonable
attorney's fees and costs incurred on said appeal, should the
Plaintiff be successful.

RESTRAINING ORDER:
16.

The

Defendant

shall be permanently

restrained

from

harassing, threatening, or bothering the Plaintiff or her tenants.
DATED this

day of

, 1989.

BY THE COURT:

David Young
District Court Judge
Approved by:
Donald W. Layton
Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Decree of Divorce to Donald W. Layton, 3801 Villa Drive,
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84109, and 220 Banks Court, Salt Lake City,
Utah

84102 postage prepaid this
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# 1989.

Jane Allen, Bar #45
Attorney for Plaintiff
8 East 300 South, Suite 735
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801) 355-1300
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH
HELEN LAYTON,
Plaintiff,

]|

ORDER OF DISSOLUTION OF

]|

CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST

]|

Civil No. D83-3977

vs.
DONALD LAYTON,
Defendant.

i

Judge David Young

This matter was decided by the Utah Court of Appeals on July
9, 1989.

The Court remanded this matter to the trial court for

further findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with
the evidence presented at trial. The Appeals Court ruled that the
parties1 relationship was not covered by the statute regarding
common law marriage, but a number of other legal theories were
suggested. The Plaintiff proposed her findings, and the Defendant
responded.

After considering the arguments of both parties the

Court has determined that the theory of constructive trust applies
to this matter, and based upon the record herein and good cause
appearing therefor, and having made and entered its findings of
fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby ordered, adjudged, and
decreed:
DECREE OF DISSOLUTION
1. The confidentail relationship of the parties is hereby

characterized as a constructive trust, and said constructive trust
created by the parties is hereby dissolved.
2. All property acquired by the parties, whether in joint or
separate name, has been equitably divided in an approximately equal
division according to value, as set forth herein.
3. The parties to this action were the only beneficiaries of
the "constructive trust," and have been duly notified of this
action, and sufficient evidence was obtained at trial to indicate
a need to equitably divide the assets of the trust.
4.

The writing produced by the Defendant does not transfer

any trust property to him, and is invalid, as it is not supported
by consideration nor has it been later ratified by the parties.
5. Accordingly, the personal and real property of the parties
shall be equitably

divided between them as follows:

PERSONAL PROPERTY:
6. The parties, along with their personal effects, owned, at
the time of the parties1 separation the following items all of
which are presently in the possession of the Defendant:
four motorcycles
three pianos
Yamaha Organ
600 ounces of silver
Train collection (est. value $10,000.00)
Mechanics tools
Carpenters tools
Tree cutting tools
Caterpillar tractor
Road grader
Dump truck
Three pickup trucks
Camper
1959 Corvette
Saab Automobile
Gun collection
Substantial miscellaneous personal property

7. The Plaintiff shall retain the personal property in her
possession, and the Defendant shall awarded the personal property
in his possession, with the party retaining
responsible for all indebtedness thereon.

an item to be

However, there is a

substantial inequity in this division, and the Plaintiff shall be
awarded the parcels of real property numbered 23-873-1 and 23-874,
page number 64 and 59 of Exhibit A as her sole and separate
property, subject to no claim by the Defendant.
8. The Plaintiff shall be awarded all personal property and
fixtures which is inside or on the real property awarded to her.
REAL PROPERTY:
9. The real property of the parties is extensive, and it is
divided as set forth in exhibit A, which is attached hereto.
PAST DUE PROPERTY TAXES, SEWER ASSESSMENTS, AND WATER BILLS:
10. The Defendant shall be responsible for all property taxes,
sewer assessments, and water bills and any other unpaid expenses
for the property awarded to the Plaintiff until it was transferred
to the Plaintiff's name alone, which occurred in July of 1987, and
those debts should be paid by Helen being awarded a lien against
parcel no.17-4963, page 50 of Exhibit A.

The amount of said lien

remains to be determined, and if the parties cannot agree as to the
amount, either party may move the court for a determination of the
amount of said lien. Said lien shall be paid whenever the property
is sold, or the Plaintiff may foreclose upon her lien if she so
desires.
CHILD SUPPORT:

11. The Defendant shall pay child support to the Plaintiff
inlthe sum of $200.00 per month for so long as he resides with the
Plaintiff.
12. Both parties shall maintain health and accident insurance
for Daniel

so long as

it is available through

his or her

employment, and they shall share equally any medical, dental,
orthodontic or optical expenses incurred by him which are not
covered by insurance.
13. The Plaintiff shall be awarded the custody of Daniel,
subject to

the Defendant's reasonable rights of visitation.

SIGN ALL PAPERS:
14. The Defendant shall sign a quit-claim deed for each parcel
awarded to the Plaintiff, and she shall do the same, within two
weeks of the decision of this Court. If the Defendant should fail
to do so, the Plaintiff may petition the Court and have the Court
execute the documents, and the Defendant shall be responsible for
her attorney's fees required in doing so.
ATTORNEY'S FEES:
15. Each party should be responsible for his or her own
attorney's fees and costs. Should the Defendant again appeal this
matter, he should be responsible for the Plaintiff's reasonable
attorney's fees and costs incurred on said appeal, should the
Plaintiff be successful.
*****

RESTRAINING ORDER:
16.

The

Defendant

shall be permanently

restrained

from

harassing, threatening, or bothering the Plaintiff or her tenants.
DATED this

day of

, 1989.

BY THE COURT:

David Young
District Court Judge
Approved by:
Donald W. Layton
Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

to

Donald W. Layton, 3801 Villa Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84109,
and 220 Banks Court, Salt Lake City, Utah
this _[

day of December, 1989.

84102 postage prepaid

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

Helen Layton,
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 900019-CA

Don Layton,
Defendant and Appellant.

Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Onrte (On Rule 31 Hearing) .
This matter is before the court pursuant to Utah R. App. P.
31.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the trial court's findings of
fact, conclusions of law and order are affirmed. In addition,
appellee is awarded reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal
on the basis that the court deems appellant's appeal frivolous
under Utah R. App. P. 33. The court finds the appeal frivolous
on the basis that appellant raised many of the same issues in
this appeal as he raised in his prior appeal before this court,
his brief did not include any citations to legal aurhority see
Utah R. App. P. 24(a), and appellant's oral argument was
largely irrelevant. In particular, while appellant sought to
upset the trial court's findings of fact, he wholly failed to
"marshal the evidence," a prerequsite to our consideration of
the adequacy of the findings of fact. See e.g., In re Bartell,
776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989). We therefore remand to the trial
court for a calculation and award of reasonable attorney fees

incurred on appeal.
DATED this 21st day of November, 1990,
ALL CONCUR:

Norman H. Jackson/^uudge

Russell W. Bench, Judge

Gregory^. Orme, Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 2 3rd day of November, 1990, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Order of Affirmance was mailed to each
of the following:
Don Layton
220 Banks Court
Salt Lake City, UT

84102

Jane Allen
Attorney at Law
8 East 300 South, Suite 735
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Honorable David Young
Salt Lake County
Third District Court
#D83-3977

ri I

l

Julia C--Whitfield
Deputy Clerk

900019-CA

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ooOoo

REMITTITUR
Helen Layton,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.

Case No. 900019-CA

Don Layton,
Defendant and Appellant.

Per ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE.
This 19th day of December, 1990,

Issued

Nov. 23, 1990

Record:

2 VOLS and 1 ENV

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of December, 1990, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing REMITTITUR was deposited in the
United States mail to the following:
Don Layton
220 Banks Court
Salt Lake City, UT

84102

Jane Allen
Attorney at Law
8 East 300 South, Suite 735
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
DATED this 19th day of December, 1990.
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Helen Layton,
ORDER DENYING REHEARING
Plaintiff and Appellee,
Case No, 900019-CA
Don Layton,
Defendant and Appellant,

Before Judges Jackson, Orme and Bench (on Rule 31 Hearing)
Appellant's petition for rehearing is denied.
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 36(a), this matter is
immediately remitted to the district court.
DATED this

//

day of December, 1990.

FOR THE COURT:

^

^
NO!
irman

^

^

H. J a c k s o n ,

.

Judge

^_^^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of December, 1990, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING REHEARING was
deposited in the United States mail to the following:
Don Layton
220 Banks Court
Salt Lake City, UT

84102

Jane Allen
Attorney at Law
8 East 300 South, Suite 735
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
DATED this 19th day of December, 1990.

, -7.
By — /

•v•

///^/// r^//
Deputy Clerk
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Helen Layton,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

ORDER DENYING REHEARING

v.
Case No. 900019-CA
Don Layton,
Defendant and Appellant,

Before Judges Jackson, Orme and Bench (on Rule 31 Heari
Appellant's petition for rehearing is denied.
Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 36(a), this matter is
immediately remitted to the district court.
DATED this
FOR THE COURT:

//

day of December, 1990.
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